**HENRY SHEVLIN**Research Associate, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge Telephone: +44 7974 274939 • Email: henry.shevlin@gmail.com  
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**EMPLOYMENT**

Research Associate, Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge  
(June 2017 – June 2020).

**EDUCATION**

*Ph.D, Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center, September 2016 (Honors)*Thesis: Consciousness, Perception, and Short-Term Memory (Supervisor: Peter Godfrey-Smith)  
Committee: Ned Block, Eric Mandelbaum, David Papineau, Jesse Prinz.

*BPhil, Philosophy, Trinity College, University of Oxford, June 2009.*Thesis: Linking Phenomenal and Access Consciousness (Supervisor: Tim Bayne)

*BA Classics, St Anne's College, University of Oxford, June 2006 (Double First).*

**AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION**

Philosophy of Mind  
Philosophy of Cognitive and Biological Science  
Animal Minds

**AREAS OF COMPETENCE**

Moral Philosophy  
Philosophy of Science  
Epistemology  
Metaphysics

**PUBLICATIONS**

“Apply rich psychological terms in AI with care” (forthcoming in *Nature Machine Intelligence*). Coauthored with Dr Marta Halina.

“Pain, Placebo, and Cognitive Penetration” (forthcoming in *Mind & Language*). Coauthored with Dr Phoebe Friessen.

“Conceptual Short-Term Memory: A Missing Part of the Mind?” (2017, *The* *Journal of Consciousness Studies*)

“The Lower Bounds of Desire” (2017, *The Journal of Consciousness Studies*; winner of the Fifth Annual Essay Prize at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology)

**PRIZES**

**2017:** Winner, President’s Excellence Award for Distinguished Teaching, Baruch College.  
**2016:** Joint winner, Fifth Annual Essay Prize at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology.  
**2015:** Joint winner, University of Oxford Future of Humanity Institute Thesis Prize.

**FELLOWSHIPS**

**2015 – 2016:** Dissertation Fellowship, CUNY Science Studies Committee ($10,000).  
**2015:** Joint winner, University of Oxford Future of Humanity Institute Thesis Prize (£400.00)  
**2014:** CUNY Doctoral Students Research Grant ($1500)  
**2010 – 2015:** Enhanced Chancellor’s Fellowship, CUNY Graduate Center ($18,000 p.a.)  
**2010 – 2015:** Mellon Scholar, CUNY Graduate Center ($5000 p.a.)  
**2011:** Nominee for AHRC funding for D.Phil, University of Oxford (declined to transfer to CUNY)  
**2009 – 2010:** Graduate Scholarship, Trinity College, Oxford (£14,000) **2007 – 2009:** Cecil Lubbock Scholar, Trinity College, Oxford (£15,000 p.a.).

**PROFESSIONAL SERVICE**

Student Committee Member, Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2015-2018).  
Referee for *Philosophical* *Psychology* (2016) and *Review of Philosophy & Psychology* (2013-2014).

Commentator on Radu Bogdan, “Self-Consciousness,” *Consciousness Online* 2012.

Peer Mentor, CUNY Graduate Center, 2012-2016, and Teaching Mentor, Baruch College, 2013-2016.

**SELECT PRESENTED PAPERS**

**March 2019 – “**Consciousness, biology, and general intelligence”. AAAI Spring Symposium 19, Stanford University.  
**July 2018 – “**Consciousness, Sentience, and Moral Status”. BSPS 2018, University of Oxford.   
**June 2018** – “Does object categorization require attention?”. International Association for Computing and Philosophy 2018, Warsaw. **September 2017 –** “The format of perceptual categorization”. Workshop on the Format of (Mental) Representations, University of Antwerp.  
**August 2017 –**“Perceiving-as: perception, cognition, or something else?”**.** European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Hertfordshire.  
**May 2017** – “Conceptual Short-Term Memory: an interface for perception and cognition”. Fifth Annual Conference on Advances in Cognitive Systems.  
**July 2016 –** “On Feeling Bad: The Psychological Basis of Suffering.” 90th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & the Mind Association. **November 2015 –** “CSTM: A Missing Piece in the Puzzle of Consciousness.”Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence.  
**July 2015 – “**Conceptual Short-Term Memory and the Richness of Experience”. 19th Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. **June 2015 –** “Conceptual Short-Term Memory: A Missing Part of the Mind.”Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University. **May 2013 –** “Do We Experience Color and Shape Generically?”. 9th International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication.

**PHILOSOPHY TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

**Supervisions conducted as Bye-Fellow (Downing College) and Philosophy Preceptor (Corpus Christi College)**

* **Ethics (Part 2)**

Michaelmas 2017

* **Ethics (Part 1B)**

Michaelmas 2017 (2 supervisions)

* **Metaphysics (Part 1A)**Michaelmas 2017, Michaelmas 2018
* **Ethics and Political Philosophy (Part 1A)**

Lent 2018, Michaelmas 2018.

* **Metaphysics and Epistemology (Part 1B)**Michaelmas 2017 (2 supervisions)
* **Philosophy of Science (Part 2)**Michaelmas 2017

**Teaching Adjunct/Adjunct Assistant Professor, Baruch College, 2011-2016.**

* **Science Fiction and Philosophy (PHI3900)**Fall 2016
* **Ethics and Critical Thinking (PHI 1100)**  
  Fall 2016 (2 sections), Spring 2016 (2 sections), Fall 2015 (2 sections)
* **Philosophy of Sex and Love (PHI 4900)**

Summer 2015

* **Philosophy of Psychology (PHI/PSY 3035)**Spring 2015
* **Thought and Reality (PHI/PSY 3030)**Fall 2014, Fall 2013, Fall 2012
* **Minds and Computers (PHI 3040)**Summer 2014, Summer 2013
* **Experimental Philosophy (PHI 3220)**Spring 2014, Fall 2012
* **Computer Ethics (CIS/PHI 3270)**

Summer 2012

* **Major Issues in Philosophy (PHI 1500)**  
  Spring 2014 (2 sections), Fall 2013, Spring 2013 (2 sections), Fall 2012, Spring 2012 (2 sections), Fall 2011 (2 sections)

**OTHER TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

**2014-2015:** Writing Fellow at the School for Continuing and Professional Studies, CUNY. **2007 – 2010:** ESL teacher, Oxford School of English, Oxford.  
**2009:** Non-Fiction Writing/Speech & Debate tutor, Oxbridge Academic Programs.  
**2007:** ESL Teacher, International House, Milan.

**LANGUAGES**

French, Italian: Advanced written and spoken.  
Tagalog: Intermediate written and spoken.  
Spanish, Japanese: Conversational written and spoken.  
Latin, Ancient Greek: Advanced written.

**GRADUATE COURSES TAKEN**

**CUNY Graduate Center**  
Philosophy of Motion Pictures (Noel Carroll, Fall 2013)  
Quine and Sellars on Thought and Language (David Rosenthal, Fall 2013)  
Non-Classical Logic (Graham Priest, Spring 2013)  
The Body and the Mind (Frederique de Vignemont, Spring 2013)  
Descartes & Contemporary Issues (David Rosenthal, Fall 2012)  
Philosophy of Mind (Jesse Prinz, Fall 2012)  
The Evolution of Meaning (Peter Godfrey-Smith, Spring 2012)  
Philosophy of Biology (Peter Godfrey-Smith, Fall 2011)  
Epistemology (Mike Levin, Fall 2011)  
Plato's Republic (Iakovos Vasiliou, Spring 2011)  
The Function of Consciousness (David Rosenthal, Spring 2011)  
Aesthetic Psychology (Jesse Prinz, Spring 2011)  
Philosophical Issues in Buddhism (Graham Priest, Fall 2010)  
Science vs. Pseudoscience (Massimo Pigliucci, Fall 2010)  
Proseminar (Stephen Neale & David Rosenthal, Fall 2010)

**University of Oxford**The Varieties of Perception (Ian Phillips & Louise Richardson, Fall 2009)  
Linking phenomenal and access consciousness (BPhil Thesis, Summer 2009)  
Philosophy of Psychology (Martin Davies, Summer 2008, class)  
Metaphysics and Epistemology (Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereira, Summer 2008, tutorial)  
Kant (Ralph Walker, Spring 2008, tutorial)  
Philosophy of Mind (Scott Sturgeon, Fall 2007, tutorial)  
The Unity of Consciousness (Tim Bayne, Fall 2007, class)

**REFERENCES**

**Peter Godfrey-Smith (Dissertation Supervisor).**Distinguished Professor, Philosophy Department, CUNY Graduate Center.  
Email: [p.godfrey.smith@gmail.com](mailto:p.godfrey.smith@gmail.com)

**Ned Block (Dissertation Committee Member).**Silver Professor of Philosophy, Psychology and Neural Science**,** New York University.Email: [ned.block@nyu.edu](mailto:ned.block@nyu.edu)

**Jesse Prinz (Dissertation Committee Member).**Distinguished Professor, Philosophy Department, CUNY Graduate Center.  
Email: [jesse@subcortex.com](mailto:jesse@subcortex.com)

**David Papineau (Dissertation Committee Member)**Visiting Presidential Professor, Philosophy Department, CUNY Graduate Center.  
Email: [david.papineau@kcl.ac.uk](mailto:david.papineau@kcl.ac.uk)t

**Eric Mandelbaum (Dissertation Committee Member and Teaching Reference)**Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, Baruch College.  
Email: [eric.mandelbaum@gmail.com](mailto:eric.mandelbaum@gmail.com)

**Douglas Lackey (Teaching Reference)**Professor and former Chair (2000-2016), Philosophy Department, Baruch College.  
Email: [dlackey@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:dlackey@gc.cuny.edu)

**DISSERTATION ABSTRACT**

When we engage in almost any perceptual activity – recognizing a face, listening out for a phone-call, or simply taking in a sunset – information must be briefly stored and processed in some form of short-term memory. For philosophers attempting to develop an empirically grounded account of perception and conscious experience, it is therefore crucial to engage with scientific theories of the kinds of short-term memory mechanisms that underlie our moment-to-moment retention of information about the world.  
 To that end, in my dissertation I review recent scientific evidence for a new form of memory, dubbed Conceptual Short-Term Memory (CSTM), and claim it is a key missing piece in philosophical debates about the mind. In Chapters 1 and 2, I present data for CSTM, arguing that it is distinguished from other forms of short-term memory via its unique combination of features such as its high capacity, brief duration, and conceptual format. In Chapter 3, I suggest that CSTM offers a powerful new way to explain categorical perception, that is, our capacity to rapidly and effortlessly classify and recognize what we perceive. In Chapter 4, I claim this capacity for categorical perception is closely bound up with consciousness itself, and present a new theory of consciousness which claims that experience arises when information reaches CSTM and is encoded in respect of basic categories. Finally, in Chapter 5, I present data showing that numerous non-human animals engage in categorical perception, and thus, by the lights of the theory given in the proceeding chapters, are likely to enjoy conscious experience. I close by showing how the arguments of the thesis can be applied to assessment of suffering in non-human animals.